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28 August 1979

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1459



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DEFICIENCIES IN SUPPLY ECONOMY AND MANAGEMENT CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 May 79 p 2

[Article by Col Justice V. Gushchin, Candidate of Legal Sciences: "The Commander and the Law: A Case of Shortage"]

[Text] A thrifty attitude toward public property is an important standard of socialist intercourse and the moral duty of every Soviet citizen, one's constitutional obligation. For military personnel, military regulations and the military oath also demand proper safekeeping of state and military property. And in the overwhelming majority of military units purposeful indoctrinational work is being done in this area, record keeping and monitoring of utilization of supplies is being set up, and military housekeeping operations are correctly organized. Competition for economy and thrift has been extensively organized in the units.

Nevertheless one still encounters cases of loss, damage and wasting of public property. I am not talking about theft, where dishonest individuals stick their hands into the public pocket. I am speaking about poor management, about lapses and gaps which occur as a consequence of ignorance and sometimes manifest disregard by some officials toward the legal standards which regulate their management activities.

...Recently company commander Capt G. Sobolev was relieved of his post in connection with transfer to a new assignment. A considerable shortage of company property was discovered. What was the reason? The subunits had not contained persons who sought personal gain at the expense of the state. The fact is that Captain Sobolev had not properly cared for company property, had relegated concerns in this regard to third-rate importance, had forgotten the requirements of the appropriate documents, and had relied in all matters exclusively on the reports of his subordinates. Somebody would lose something, would fail to make a bookkeeping credit entry for something, and would release something without a receipt. And yet according to Internal Service Regulations and the regulations on unit administration and management, a company commander shall keep proper records on property and supplies, shall keep suitable records on receipt of supplies and release to stores, and shall at least once a month personally inspect the state of the company housekeeping operation and require appropriate inspections by platoon leaders and the company sergeant major.

Of course commanding officers have a long list of responsibilities. And of course one must trust one's subordinates. However, to divide responsibilities specified by law into more and less important concerns and to have a casual approach to protection and care of property are serious errors. And the company commander was forced to pay for these mistakes, in both the direct and indirect meaning of the word.

Unfortunately some unit and naval ship commanders also make mistakes of this kind. On a certain ship, for example, over an extended period of time food was transferred from stores to galley by eyeball estimate -- there were simply no scales on board. In addition, storekeepers kept changing, but there never was a formal inventory and transfer of supplies to the next man. While aware of the situation, the ship's commanding officer unfortunately did not deem it necessary to intervene, nor did he instruct his executive officer, Sr Lt G. Antipov, to set things right. And once again a supply shortage situation arose. But this time they had to "mend the holes" in the ship's housekeeping operations with the assistance of military lawyers.

I shall comment that, according to data obtained from criminal investigations, the principal factor promoting loss of state property is negligent performance by command personnel of their duties pertaining to supervision of unit (ship) housekeeping operations, a lack of monitoring and verification of housekeeping operations, keeping of records, storage and safekeeping of supplies. To these causes I would add those connected with the sometimes poor performance of internal inspection commissions of units and naval ships, which once again should be operating under the supervision of one-man commanders.

It would be appropriate to state, turning once again to the above-stated facts, that one can see that the errors of omission in ship and company administrative supervision and management became possible on the part of both commanders to a substantial degree because these comrades were reminded of this obligation neither by their immediate superiors, nor by rear services specialists, nor by volunteer inspectors.

I believe that we should specifically address the role of higher headquarters, audit and inspection agencies in the area of safekeeping and proper utilization of state and military property. They should inspect and audit on a regular basis, thoroughly and comprehensively, with mandatory determination and correction of the causes of concrete deficiencies in the administrative and housekeeping activities of the inspected and audited personnel, but this does not always happen.

At the end of last year the judge advocate's office at a certain garrison took a look into observance of the laws dealing with safeguarding socialist property in the battalion under the command of Engr-Maj S. Prilepskiy. It was determined that quite a few trucks, bulldozers, and cranes had been standing idle for quite some time. What was the reason for this? There were no spare parts. It was immediately established, however, that a number of parts could be fabricated with the battalion's own resources. The explanation

was quite simple: it seemed that higher headquarters had not been properly monitoring the state of affairs in the subunit; it had kept accepting excuses and, instead of arranging for correct maintenance and repair of equipment, had kept assigning new vehicles to the battalion. This is certainly an example of flagrant mismanagement, a clear case of squandering of costly equipment! It is eminently fair that responsibility for this state of affairs was borne, alongside the battalion and unit commanders, by higher headquarters officers S. Zorkin, G. Bondarin, and others.

The readers have undoubtedly heard and read in the press on numerous occasions about construction jobs not completed on schedule by the construction crews. They have read and become indignant: cannot something be done about people who are "freezing" substantial state assets? Something can be done. For example, Article 62 of the Regulations on Capital Construction Contracts states that negligent contractors must pay to clients fines and penalties for each day (!) of delay in completing a job. In many cases, however, these penalties are not imposed. What is the reason for this?

This question was asked in particular of Engr-Capt B. Kalinichev, spokesman for a military client. And there was good reason for the question: a number of jobs for this military unit had been completed by military construction crews with a delay of 6 months and more! And here is the explanation given: the unit could run up against counterclaims -- for delay in providing the builders with the needed documentation and equipment.... This kind of mutual forgiveness for mismanagement and manifest lack of principles engender chronic construction project delays and lead to overexpenditure of state funds.

Cases of this kind are a consequence of a narrow, parochial approach, inability, and sometimes disinclination on the part of certain supervisors to do things efficiently, at minimum cost. It is important to nip these tendencies in the bud and to change this parasite psychology.

The CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" points to the necessity of persistently campaigning "for strengthening of labor and state discipline, increased responsibility for the assigned task, for economy and a thrifty attitude toward socialist property, against waste and parochialism."

These points also directly apply to the activities of command personnel, who are obligated to conduct unit and shipboard administrative and house-keeping operations in a zealous manner, to demand the same of their subordinates, and to indoctrinate their men in a spirit of a thrifty attitude toward public property. Also of considerable importance here are the laws which regulate administrative-housekeeping activities in the army and navy. It is necessary for officials to be thoroughly familiar with these regulations, to observe them unswervingly, and intelligently to apply them in the interests of further strengthening the combat readiness of units and naval ships.

EXCESSIVE FREIGHT CAR DEMURRAGE

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 May 79 p 2

[Article by Lt Col Yu. Lashch: "If Measured in Rubles"]

[Text] We know that the better the freight carrying capacity of railroad cars is utilized, the greater the economic effect will be, for the current charge for hauling a loaded freight car a distance of 1,000 kilometers is 168 rubles. Bearing this in mind, the officers of the military rail transport service of the Carpathian Military District have made a number of efficiency innovation suggestions to improve the loading of four-axle flatcars. Adoption of the suggestions submitted by Lt Col Yu. Vlasov, Maj A. Shcherbina, and Capts N. Kozlyuk, S. Martyshevskiy and N. Galkin made it possible to save more than 220,000 rubles last year. Considerable benefit is also derived by the adoption of electronic computers, which make it possible to achieve efficiency and precision in planning military freight hauls.

Unfortunately the savings from adopting these new innovations are substantially reduced due to an incorrect attitude toward transportation on the part of some unit and subunit commanders who ship various goods. Sometimes they reason approximately as follows: we settle accounts with the railroaders not in cash but with requisitions, and therefore why should we waste time determining what cars should be ordered when and how the goods should be placed in these cars?

The railroad sustains considerable financial loss from freight car demurrage, which occurs through the fault of a number of construction directorate organizations. For example, on the spurs of the UNR [Office of the Work Supervisor] which is directed by Col S. Korobnik, freight car idle time in 1978 increased by 150% over 1977, totaling 7,725 car-hours. Car idle time last year totaled 2,244 car-hours through the fault of the UNR under Engr-Lt Col V. Dudnik. Recently there has been increasing demurrage of cars by the construction organizations in which Majs O. Glinchikov and V. Tsypchenko serve as deputy commander for supply.

Of course organizations pay the railroad fines, and sometimes substantial fines, for inefficient freight car utilization and demurrage. As experience indicates, however, this is failing to eradicate this bad practice for, after all, the money is coming from the state. The following question arises: perhaps demurrage fines should be levied on the persons in charge of those organizations to blame for the demurrage.

OFFICER RESENTED FOR WRITING COMPLAINT LETTER

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 May 79 p 2

[Article by Maj V. Semenov: "Following a Complaint"]

[Text] ...It began out on the range. On that day they were testing the officers on weapon training. The results were not gratifying. Firing was already in progress when unit deputy commander Maj N. Korobchuk instructed Sr Lt Yu. Yushin to bring several spare targets. The latter was slow about executing the instructions, and at this point Major Korobchuk, who was already in a bad mood, broke down completely. He started shouting and crudely dressed his subordinate down in the presence of a large number of other officers.

Yushin could hardly wait for the exercise to end. When they returned to the unit, he went over to headquarters. He wanted to tell the commanding officer what had happened. But then he decided not to knock on the commanding officer's door. He went back to his quarters and proceeded to write a letter to the political section. It was not pleasant to rake over the events of that ill-fated day. He finally managed to complete one and a half pages.

What was he expecting to accomplish when he sat down to write up his complaint? He assumed they would respond to it and calmly look into the matter. Yushin was not seeking a great deal -- just to hear words of apology and to have his emotional equilibrium restored. He had no idea that his letter would be filed away and forgotten and that a great deal of unpleasantness lay ahead for him.

...At the combined unit political section they are well aware of the importance of response to letters and complaints. In an interview with this correspondent they named a good many commanders and political workers who show concern for their men, who are able to sympathize with the problems of others and who can help resolve a difficult problem. They also recalled Sr Lt Yushin's letter. Why had they not responded immediately? The explanation was simple: Yushin had gone on leave, and Korobchuk flatly denied guilt. They could proceed no further.... It is difficult to establish at the present time who had told the political section representative over the telephone that Yushin was away from the base. They accepted the telephone

reply as truthful. And although an extremely rare incident had taken place in a unit located very close to the political section, for some reason they decided to wait awhile before proceeding with the complaint investigation.

But Sr Lt Yu. Yushin had not left the base. He was continuing to report every day for duty and... was waiting for a response to his letter. This delay aggravated the situation even further. Major Korobchuk took every opportunity to make it clear to his subordinate that "he would quickly set him to rights." And the regimental commander, learning that the officer had written a complaint, became ~~very~~ ^{wary}. Now Yushin was being criticized for hanging out the dirty wash, ~~as they say~~. Frequently these rebukes were delivered in an abusive manner. In addition, they began persistently hinting that he would be taken off the waiting list for housing. Reprimands and punishments became more frequent....

Military duty was unpleasant in this situation. Nor could he relax at home. His wife understood what was happening and did not bother him with questions. But she could not remain calm when a loved one was suffering. Frequently on returning home, Yushin saw that his wife had been crying. At such times he thought to himself: Perhaps it is not worth it to ask for trouble; perhaps I should swallow the insult and pretend like nothing has happened. Then he would not get those disapproving glances at work, and his wife's tears would stop. And finally he would find the time to take his three-year-old son to the sun-warmed sea and show him real ships....

He sighed with relief when he was summoned to unit headquarters. He was hoping that the conflict would be finally resolved.

Lt Col Yu. Akimov and several other officers were in the office.

"So you are making up complaints?" Yuriy Vladimirovich Akimov's eyes flashed angrily. "I will not tolerate this...." He then proceeded to upbraid Yushin in no uncertain terms.

Yushin was told he would no longer be serving in the unit.

This was no empty threat. As soon as the opportunity arose, they immediately tried to get rid of this undesirable. Senior Lieutenant Yushin's file was hastily sent up the chain of command to arrange a transfer to another unit. This turn of events following the formal complaint completely devastated the young officer. In total desperation, he once again took up the pen and requested assistance from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA....

A question naturally arises: why did Senior Lieutenant Yushin's letter to the political section evoke such an unexpected reaction? And at this point it is appropriate to state the following. This unit is highly regarded in the combined unit. However, things in the unit were not all as satisfactory as until recently had been described in the reports. Some people, and certainly Lieutenant Colonel Akimov and Major Korobchuk, were well aware of the deficiencies in indoctrinational work, of violations in disciplinary

practices, as well as the "seasonal business" in which their subordinates were engaged, not without their knowledge, at the local furniture factory.... They knew that people would not be happy if they made these facts known.

Yushin's complaint not only threw a shadow on the good reputation of the Communists in charge of the unit but also provided serious grounds for people at the higher echelon to entertain doubts as to the satisfactory state of affairs and to root out those facts which were being so zealously concealed. Whether intentionally or not, Senior Lieutenant Yushin stirred up the atmosphere of complacency which had been established in this unit.

While en route to the unit I recalled a conversation which had taken place on the previous day. I recalled the words of the political section chief to the effect that the ability of a leader at any level to respond kindly to his men's complaints and suggestions and correctly to respond to criticism leveled at him is one of the criteria of his maturity and party-mindedness. A true statement. If comrades Akimov and Korobchuk had been less arrogant and had displayed pedagogic tact in this difficult situation, if they had not heeded the dictate of wounded pride, but had proceeded as is demanded by party conscience, military regulations and our moral principles, this sharp conflict and situation of jangled nerves would not have developed.

I must frankly admit that I was also entertaining other thoughts at the time. Enough time had gone by since the incident in order to weigh in detail all the pros and cons and to draw correct conclusions from this dragged-out situation. But contrary to expectations, events developed quite differently. Party member Akimov avoided straight talk with me. He was insincere and put the blame on others. And of course he threw the blame particularly on Senior Lieutenant Yushin -- a "pettifogger," an "anonymous denouncer," etc.

And in my conversation with Major Korobchuk, he had the least to say about his behavior that day at the range which, as we know, led to the conflict. He also had plenty of nasty things to say about Yushin. If one added up all the things said about this young officer by his senior comrades, a rather gloomy picture emerges. The lieutenant had a low level of competence. He conducted training activities poorly from a methodological standpoint. He was a poor marksman. He could not get along with others....

Of course if a young officer genuinely possesses serious deficiencies, they should be stated loudly and clearly. But there was one disturbing thing. Yushin had become "poor" following his complaint. I was able to take a look at his personal file. In his last fitness report, from the previous year, he was given the highest praise, as he had in the past: "A hard-working, efficient officer. Demanding on himself and on his subordinates. He possesses thorough knowledge of the combat equipment and operates it expertly. He is an excellent athlete. He enjoys the respect of his fellow servicemen...."

I have quoted here from Yushin's fitness report. The report was signed by commission members Lt Col Yu. Akimov, Maj N. Korobchuk, and other officers. In what instance were they telling the truth? And was it not only to save their own face that they were now attempting to paint this "troublemaker" in the darkest hues?

The Central Committee decree on further improvement of ideological and political indoctrination work states that where criticism and self-criticism are not observed, where public affairs are not adequately publicized, direct detriment is done to activeness by the masses.

In the unit we are discussing, less and less frequently are people's voices raised at party meetings. Some individuals are now fearful of speaking out openly against shortcomings. Some people have become convinced that in such cases one should simply remain silent. It is true that I felt somewhat embarrassed for Maj I. Vakaryuk and other Communists when they were told how Yushin had been insulted and his career threatened. During our interview these comrades remained silent, embarrassedly avoiding my gaze, defending themselves with a neutral reply: "I don't remember...."

Before leaving I once again went to unit headquarters. Both Lieutenant Colonel Akimov and Major Korobchuk stated with conviction that the Yushin incident had taught them a lot. I was pleasantly surprised. I shall not conceal the fact that I was even hoping that these sincere words would be followed by a critical analysis of performance and changes for the better in the unit. But then Yuriy Vladimirovich said: "I wouldn't like this story to get out."

As if replying to an unstated question, he explained: "You support one complainer and others will start writing letters."

There was a hard, metallic sound to Akimov's voice.

3024

CSO: 1801

NEW MEDAL FOR STRENGTHENING COMBAT COOPERATION DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 May 79 p 1

[Ukase, Statute, and Description of Medal by M. Georgadze, Secretary, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet]

[Text] Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Establishment of the Medal "For Strengthening the Fighting Alliance"

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decrees:

1. Establishment of the Medal "For Strengthening the Fighting Alliance."
2. Ratification of the Statute on the Medal "For Strengthening the Fighting Alliance."
3. Ratification of the description of the Medal "For Strengthening the Fighting Alliance."

L. Brezhnev, Chairman, Presidium of the
USSR Supreme Soviet
M. Georgadze, Secretary, Presidium of the
USSR Supreme Soviet

Moscow, the Kremlin, 25 May 1979

Statute on the Medal "For Strengthening the Fighting Alliance"

1. The Medal "For Strengthening the Fighting Alliance" shall be awarded to military personnel, personnel of state security and internal affairs agencies as well as other citizens of the Warsaw Pact member nations, as well as of other socialist and friendly nations for services in strengthening the fighting alliance and military cooperation.
2. The Medal "For Strengthening the Fighting Alliance" shall be awarded on behalf of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR by the USSR Minister

of Defense, USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, and by the Chairman of the USSR State Security Committee. This medal shall not be awarded a second time to the same person.

The recipient shall receive together with the medal an accompanying certificate of the established form.

3. The Medal "For Strengthening the Fighting Alliance" shall be worn on the left side of the chest and, if worn in the company of USSR government decorations and other medals, shall follow the "60th Anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces" jubilee medal.

M. Georgadze, Secretary, Presidium of
the USSR Supreme Soviet

Description of the Medal "For Strengthening the Fighting Alliance"

The Medal "For Strengthening the Fighting Alliance" is made of tombac, of a golden hue, in the shape of a circular disk 32 millimeters in diameter.

On the obverse of the medal there is a five-pointed star, the points of which are coated with red enamel. Located in the center of the star is a shield bearing the following inscriptions: "For Strengthening the Fighting Alliance" and "USSR." Laurel branches are situated to the left and the right of the star adjacent to the edge of the medal, and below the star there are two crossed swords. All designs and inscriptions are raised in relief. The obverse of the medal is ringed with a raised border. The reverse of the medal is of a mat finish.

The medal is joined by a lug and ring to a pentagonal block frame covered with a 24 mm wide silk moire ribbon. The ribbon design combines the colors of the Warsaw Pact member nations. Lengthwise colored stripes on the ribbon alternate from left to right in the following order: green, white, red, yellow, black, yellow, red, white, dark blue. Stripe widths are as follows: green and dark blue -- 4 mm; white, yellow and black -- 1 mm; red -- 5.5 mm.

M. Georgadze, Secretary, Presidium of
the USSR Supreme Soviet

3024
CSO: 1801

TRAINING OF SIGNAL UNIT RECRUITS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 May 79 p 1

[Article by Col V. Nagornyy, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Steps Toward Mastery"]

[Text] "Dress right, dress!"

The formation noticeably quavered, as if groping for an invisible ruler; the flanks became more clearly delineated. Sr Lt P. Pavlov noted with satisfaction the zeal of the men who were striving to master the fundamentals of parade ground drill.

Of course both the ranks and the responses to commands were far from perfection, because the rudiments of military training were being learned by young recruits who had just arrived as signal unit replacements. And the officer, taking note of the natural deficiencies in the actions of the men, was well aware of the fact that weeks of intensive training would pass before they fully eliminated these shortcomings and developed the solid skills which are so necessary for performance of their duties both with the complex communications gear and in a field-combat situation.

It was quite understandable that the training classes organized by Senior Lieutenant Pavlov on the first day of summer training with the young replacements were only part of that great amount of work which is performed in this unit with particular diligence. Office V. Luchko, analyzing the first progress reports, stated: "Based on past experience, we have set for ourselves the following goal: to make the young replacements fully trained approximately three times faster than the established timetable."

He was referring to accelerated training of a number of specialists, who could meet the third class performance standards and would be approved to stand unsupervised alert duty. Quite frankly, this is no simple task, but nobody in the unit doubts its successful accomplishment. The officers began with the main thing -- a thorough study of the new men. Senior Lieutenant Pavlov, for example, keeps unique records on his men. This is not the first time he has dealt with this category of military personnel, and he knows full well how important it is promptly to determine the strong and weak points of the newcomers, their proclivities and potential capabilities.

"We spend all the time that is needed on individual interviews," the senior lieutenant related. "Of course these conversations are completely informal and conducted in an atmosphere which promotes frankness. We have already had results...."

One can learn from the officer's notes whose fathers or grandfathers fought in the Great Patriotic War and whose older brothers have already served in the military, constituting the first attentive mentors of today's soldiers. The notes specify who had held down a civilian job prior to induction, where one's parents worked, and how the young men spent their leisure time -- athletics, music, literature....

The officer's records also contained information on the general educational level of the new recruits. It was fairly high. One third of the replacements have attended trade school, while the rest have completed the 10-year school.

Thorough knowledge of one's men makes it possible to determine the soldiers' future occupational specialty better and with less chance of a mistake -- who should be trained, for example, as a radio operator and who should be trained as a maintenance specialist.

Constant attention shown to the new recruits helps establish firm contacts between superiors and subordinates. The newcomers become accustomed to the military life and to procedure laid down by regulations.

We spoke with some of them. We learned that Pvts A. Baklashov, S. Komarov, N. Zavvalov and others had worked in Communist labor brigades prior to induction. Here too they had set to work with enthusiasm and had already achieved certain success in their training.

The young men were pleased that they would be serving in a unit which has been ranked excellent for five years in a row now and stands on the Honor Role of the military council of the group of forces. The newcomers learned many useful and interesting things at get-togethers with the unit's chiefs of services, personnel rated excellent in training, and the top proficiency-rated specialists. The young men have become familiar with the names of top proficiency-rated personnel Capt A. Dmitriyev, Engr-Sr Lt S. Krasnitskiy and N. Sova, as well as Warrant Officers M. Rudik and N. Kudelya, who will lead them to the heights of skilled performance.

For the time being the newcomers are under the tutelage of Lts S. Avdeyev, S. Masolov and Yu. Myasnikov -- commanders of excellent-rated platoons.

There is a highly interesting feature in the work methods employed by these young officers. They seek not simply to convey to their subordinates a sum total of knowledge and skills but to develop in the men a love of military affairs and of all the skills they will be mastering. And it is quite understandable that the men themselves seek knowledge and desire to learn as much as possible.

In the evening, when the busy day of training is over, the newcomers come to the training classrooms to observe how their senior comrades and highly experienced specialists drill, seeking to learn the secrets of their skill and ability.

Komsomol activists work assiduously in the Lenin Room, under the supervision of political worker Lt V. Santuryan: they must quickly put out "lightnings" and combat leaflets, properly publicizing those whom the commander today designated as outstanding performers, and they must find a sharp comment for those who have performed without proper zeal. A special place in these news bulletins will be devoted to those comrades in arms who have achieved the greatest success in the competition on the day's tasks.

The young soldiers are confidently striding toward mastery.

3024

CSO: 1801

TANK AND ARTILLERY UNITS TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Tank Regiment Shortcomings Noted

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 May 79 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col V. Moroz: "Result of an Underestimation of Tactics: Percentage of Destruction"]

[Text] There is an official term: percentage of target destruction. These words, smelling of powder, remind tankers and motorized riflemen of the agonizing minutes of waiting while the battle already is behind them, but its outcome is vague and each one wants to know: Just what is there in the checkers' notebooks? The ratio of destroyed targets to their overall number is a serious indicator. If it is low, that means the defense was not overcome, the "enemy" counterattacks were not repulsed and there was no victory. But it is a training battle and everything can be stated more simply: This percentage determines the grade.

In the exercise of the battalion commanded by Capt V. Glushchenko, the percentage of target destruction turned out to be such that it was even awkward for the tankers to talk about. The bitterness alone remained after the exercise, and how! The battalion had been declared outstanding at the end of last year; it had received a good grade in a field fire exercise in the middle of winter; and now, several weeks later, it was not able to confirm it.

It is impossible to say why the tankers, who had been considered competition leaders, moved into the category of laggards without an analysis of the practice battle. The unit staff prepared the exercise and regimental commander Lt Col A. Latushkin directed it. Changes naturally had occurred in the tactical situation in comparison with the preceding exercise, but they were far from those which would make the situation uncustomary for the tankers. Nevertheless, the subunit was not able to repeat its recent success. Why?

Much will become clear after telling about what is in my view one of the most indicative episodes. The gaps in the tankers' field training showed up especially visibly in repulsing the counterattack.

The personnel knew where the "enemy" would counterattack: Only one direction for repulsing counterattacks had been arranged in the training center. But there are rocks under the surface, as they say, in any exercise. Because of insufficient teamwork of the subunit and miscalculations in control it turned out that 2d Company outstripped the others in moving to a line which could not be crossed because of the target situation. The situation obligated the exercise director to denote a counterattack immediately.

But Lt Col Latushkin did not give the signal to display targets. Meanwhile the battalion commander halted 2d Company and waited for the others to pull up or, in other words, to straighten up the skirmish line. A pause set in which was impossible to explain. The checker could not help but intervene: He demanded the targets be raised.

The "enemy" counterattacked with a tank company. Although he had a superiority in forces, Capt Glushchenko still ordered his subordinates to repulse the counterattack by fire from in place. The decision was not one of the better ones. The "enemy" was attempting to delay the attackers and win time. But the battalion commander was not prepared for another decision. Counterattacks always had been repulsed by fire from in place on this line; the tankers had not practiced other methods either in exercises or in tactical drill problems.

In the situation at hand the remaining companies had to conduct fire from distances greater than in the past exercise and at unusual target angles. Here it became clear that many gunners were not able to apply the firing rules. They made errors in determining ranges to targets and sight settings. Officers did not adjust fire. Company commanders Sr Lt G. Mazunin and Lt S. Yeremin were not heard on the air. The rate of fire turned out to be inadmissibly low. When the time of target display expired and crews unloaded weapons, the report came: 22 artillery rounds--almost a fourth of the ammunition assigned for the exercise--had not been expended. Where would the holes come from? An inspection of the targets confirmed it. The greater part of the gun targets had not been hit.

The tankers' first reaction to what had happened was that chance had let them down. If the subunits allegedly had acted a bit more cohesively, if 3d Company had managed to be committed from the second echelon faster, if... This resembled an incident during a check in another unit. There a young officer in all seriousness explained a failure in performing an exercise by the fact that he had not fired from the right "lane," to which he had been accustomed, but from the left.

Yes, if unexpected things had not happened in the dynamics of the training battle and if there had been no deviations at all from the "scenario" of the past exercise, the result of the field firing could have been higher. This assumption is not unfounded. During single shot fire prior to this the tankers hit targets accurately day and night. The company commanded by Sr Lt Mazunin, which earned an especially large number of rebukes in the exercise, also was among those distinguished at the moving target tank gunnery range.

It is not enough to have skills acquired during single shot fire for effective employment of weapons in combat. Fire must be "fused" with tactics. There must be a high degree of teamwork of the subunit, the ability to reconnoiter targets, and the ability to prepare data for firing quickly and faultlessly in any situations inherent to combat. The tankers were not able to acquire this complex of knowledge in the tank gunnery practices as all classes in the weapons compound were aimed at performing single shot firing exercises.

The low mark received by the battalion was natural. Those in the regiment preferred merely to talk about the leading role of tactics. But here are the facts. The tankers have difficulty recalling when they took part in opposed forces exercises. In two days, from 20 through 21 March, the unit managed to hold six (!) company field fire exercises, while the methodology makes it obligatory to set aside up to two days for each of them. There was firing in these exercises, but no tactics. Is it possible under these conditions to learn to cross minefields, to master the methods of movement and commitment of second echelons, to master methods of repulsing counterattacks, or to practice coordination? Of course not. As the check showed, all these matters had not been genuinely assimilated in the battalion.

Here is an interesting detail. I saw an excerpt from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA with lines underlined in colored pencil lying on the desk of the regimental party committee secretary. It was an article about the consequences of a separation of fire from tactics and of oversimplifications in field firings. The article was about another unit and another district, but the party committee considered it necessary to discuss the newspaper presentation. Since then the article has been kept under glass as a reminder and a warning. The party committee drew the proper conclusions from it and the regimental commander shared them completely. As we see, however, in practice neither the commander nor the party entity really fought to implement these conclusions. Just why is the "assembly line" conduct of exercises, long ago condemned by methodology, so tenacious?

There is an explanation for this. Tactical training is one of the most laborious training subjects, if it can be stated thus. Time and the ability to work with perspective and a long range view are necessary for solving each problem. But the regiment's officers often were carried away by the desire for high results this very minute. Lt Col Latushkin showed no consistency in direction of the training process. And so an adaptation to a specific situation and "coaching" in standard situations occurred in the classes. This path is especially tempting if checkers from higher headquarters close their eyes to oversimplifications. That was the case with the tankers as well.

The regiment commanded by Lt Col Latushkin enjoys special attention from the division headquarters and the district combat training directorate. There are special reasons for this. The regiment was first among units of the Red Banner Odessa Military District to support the initiators of socialist

competition in the Ground Forces. Its pledges became a reference point for other military collectives. The concern for a unit which had become the leader of competition in the district is understandable.

It was not without the help of officers of the district combat training directorate that the regiment was provided with a precise rhythm of training and the separation of personnel from classes was precluded. The tankers fulfilled the winter period training plan. There were even more firings than planned. They succeeded by numbers, as they say. With regard to the quality of classes, the reader already knows what it was.

The senior comrades sanctioned the oversimplifications and indulgences in training as it were by not giving them a fundamental appraisal. The field fire exercise at which Capt Glushchenko's subordinates received a good grade prior to the check took place under the supervision of officers of the district combat training directorate. Checkers recounted holes in targets in the most thorough manner. There was complete objectivity here, but then everything reduced to the principle: Tactics always allegedly will be affixed to the holes.

Tactics was not affixed. That which could not have happened did happen during a check of the regiment by officers of the Ground Forces Main Combat Training Directorate.

When a grade given by "friendly" checkers is not confirmed by a higher echelon, this attests to a dissimilar sense of principle of officials given the high right of monitoring. Lack of confirmation of a high grade is a blow to indoctrination and to competition effectiveness. Each such instance can be included in the "percentage of destruction" of a very different, moral sort. This "percentage" turned out to be especially alarming in the unit commanded by Lt Col Latushkin: Not one subunit confirmed its last year's indicators. The outstanding regiment had difficulty achieving a satisfactory grade. There is something to ponder here, and not just in the unit.

The tankers entered the summer training period knowing the true value of their training. The year's results will depend on their ability to learn lessons from the past.

Flamethrower Tank Platoon Training

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 May 79 p 1

[Article by Sr Lt V. Svetikov, Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District: "Masters of Military Affairs: Flamethrower Platoon Attacks"]

[Text] The pass, open to all the winds, gave the tankers an unfriendly greeting. Shreds of clouds hung to the very ground. Fog swirled around the tracks. Pressing down the broken road, the tanks clambered up the

serpentine higher into the mountains. At times it seemed to be a matter of meters to the precipice and that the multiton vehicle would no longer make the steep turn and would fall below. But the driver-mechanic would reduce rpm literally just before the precipice, turn the tank with filigree precision and continue movement.

Keeping an eye on the column through the observation instrument, Gds Sr Lt V. Pochernin noted with satisfaction that the crews were strictly maintaining speed and interval between vehicles. There was no question that the march was difficult, but the most important moment lay ahead--attack on the strongpoint using flamethrowers. The flamethrower tank platoon was supposed to destroy the "enemy" reinforced concrete emplacement by a surprise attack.

Gds Sr Lt Vladimir Pochernin commands the platoon for the fourth year and the platoon has been outstanding all this time. The command heights did not come to the young officer all at once. After completing the Order of Lenin Tashkent Higher Tank Command School inenit Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Mar Arm'd Trps P. S. Ryba 'ko, he assumed that he had acquired good knowledge. He also had a fervent desire to work. He took to the work boldly and energetically, but soon it turned out that diligence and industriousness were not enough. Far from everything turned out as it should have. He shared his doubts in a letter to his father, a full wearer of the Order of Glory. A response arrived quickly. Reading it, Vladimir dwelled on the underlined lines: "Trust people more, especially your closest assistants, the NCO's..." His father had hit the nail on the head. He, yesterday's cadet, did not have enough experience in working with people. He would take on everything himself and would give the NCO's only simple assignments. It would turn out that he would correct one thing while another would be neglected. Heeding his father's advice, Pochernin began to entrust more to the NCO's and he gained a mutual understanding with them. He turned to senior comrades and subunit party members for help. Gds Maj V. Korshikov helped Pochernin in the motor pool in servicing tanks and Gds Sr Lt V. Sutormin gave valuable recommendations on organizing competition among crews. Things gradually began to improve. By the end of the training year the platoon had become outstanding. Since then it invariably has held first place in socialist competition.

Well-arranged ideological indoctrination work with personnel is among the factors which ensured success. By displaying constant concern for improving the tankers' combat training and for indoctrinating personnel, the officer strives to arm them with the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist teaching and instil a communist attitude toward labor. He helps each soldier gain a deeper awareness of the social importance of his military labor.

...At the appointed time the flamethrower tank platoon moved through the pass and into the designated high-mountain area. The flamethrower tanks moved into the attack after deploying into combat formation on a favorable line. The strip of range territory with escarpments and steep post obstacles with craters all around flashed in the armored glass of the command vehicle.

"With the flamethrower, emplacement right at the cliff... Fire!" Gds Sr Lt Pochernin gave the command, pressing to the eyepiece of the observation instrument. The gunner pressed the electric trigger button. A shaft of flame darted toward the emplacement. A stream of fire also splashed from another vehicle. A third tank finished the job. The emplacement was destroyed.

When the exercise was over the district commander gave high praise to the platoon's combat training and commended the personnel.

Artillery Battery Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jun 79 p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Bozhko, Red Banner Kiev Military District: "When the Narrative Problem Came"]

[Text] Combat work was going on at the command-observation post. Battery commander Lt V. Shpilevskiy was determining target coordinates and passing them to the firing position after receiving initial data from the reconnaissance squad. It appeared that it would only be a little while before rounds would be flying to the target. The officer (as well as all his subordinate artillerymen, by the way) had no doubt of this.

Suddenly everything became complicated. The senior chief who was nearby unexpectedly gave a narrative problem to shift fire. In addition, reconnaissance squad personnel were "disabled."

All artillerymen looked hopefully at the commander. After a second's confusion, the latter clarified the target's position on the map, fixed its coordinates on the fire control instrument, announced them to the firing position and gave the command to open fire.

The plume of an explosion soared up in the vicinity of the target. Using observation instruments, the lieutenant determined the position of the burst in relation to the target, calculated corrections and passed on a new command to the firing position.

Let's divert ourselves from the firing for a moment and analyze the lieutenant's actions. He had been placed in a situation which might be encountered rather frequently in contemporary combat. On receiving the order to shift fire, the battalion commander made the proper decision and performed the assigned mission.

What helped him in this? Above all, his high professional expertise. He acquired this quality in classes in the system of command training, which is arranged precisely and methodologically correctly in this regiment. Artillery range practices and practice firings are conducted at an especially high level.

These matters are under the strict supervision of the regimental commander and staff. The party organization constantly keeps them in its field of view. Unit officers take an active part in socialist competition. Contests are held among them regularly for the right to be termed the best specialist.

A good training facility has been set up in the regiment and control facilities are being improved. By the way, Lt Shpilevskiy determined corrections in that firing practice with the help of a fire control instrument improved by battery commander Capt A. Cherkasets. This instrument makes the firer's work easier, allows reducing the time for preparing initial firing data, and permits achieving high fire accuracy.

The unit's officers always are searching for new unused reserves for increasing the effectiveness and quality of the training process. At one time the commanders experienced difficulties in controlling the gunners' combat work. It was difficult for the senior battery officer to pass on commands to team commanders with the existing intervals between pieces and the rumble at the firing position during firing. This circumstance sometimes was the reason for errors by gunners.

Battalion chief of staff Capt A. Kharin found the solution. At his suggestion the regiment made special intercons providing reliable communications at the firing position. They are simple in design and require no great physical inputs. Unit rationalizers created electrified aiming points and night reference points, and illuminated stakes for forming the sheaf. They introduced many other innovations which made the work of gunners and firing officers easier.

...Seeing the group of bursts, Lt Shpilevskiy intersected it, determined new corrections, passed them to the firing position and began fire for effect. The target was destroyed.

In giving the battery commander's actions the highest grade, the senior chief took note of his ability to act decisively under the complex conditions of modern warfare.

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FOOD SERVICE TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Jun 79 p 2

[Article by LtCol V. Grigor'yev, Red Banner Far East Military District: "The Cooks Take a Test,"; comments by Engr-LtCol N. Khmyz, Food Service OIC, Far East Military District]

[Text] Shining through the high windows, the sunlight was reflected in the mirrors, tile, engravings and dining hall implements. Cordial and cozy everyday, the EM dining hall facility looked especially festive today. There was a reason for this: Lt V. Trofimov, the regimental food service officer, was conducting a food preparation demonstration and test. This means that the entire processing "chain"--from the storehouse to the dinner table--was undergoing its monthly test in accordance with the regulations. The regimental political officer and the logistics officer were conducting it along with the OIC. This was a tradition which had developed within the regiment.

At first, Lt Trofimov tested the cooks' knowledge of their duties, ration allowances, the menu and portions for this week and the rules for preparing different dishes. Then, together with the dining hall duty NCO, instructor-cook Pvt V. Babadzhanov got his produce at the storehouse and checked the quality of it. Now, all the cooks had been brought into the work. Today, they are preparing Russian salad, pea soup, boiled rice and meat and pudding for their comrades-in-arms.

After putting on a apron I walked through the spacious kitchen shops and observed the swift but precisely calculated movements of the soldiers' hands. I heard the comments which Lt Trofimov was making. For example, to the effect that each potato should be inspected and the eyes removed after the potatoes were cleaned: the equipment could not handle this job. But there were not very

many comments; the daily lessons with the cooks and the thorough briefing for the kitchen police had their effect. For example, the pudding is poured into bowls while it is still hot so it will not "get thin"; gravy is poured on the meat as soon as it is done so it will not lose its taste.

After one of the companies had finished eating, I asked the soldiers if they liked the dinner.

"It was okay," they said, "as always."

Well, it is obviously good that they did not notice anything special in today's dinner. After all, the food preparation demonstration and test are conducted so the servicemen will get their fill of tasty food everyday.

At the editor's request, Engr-LtCol N. Khmyz, Food Service OIC, Far East Military District, gave us his opinion on the role of the food preparation demonstration and test in improving the servicemen's nutrition.

Military regulations set out a broad package of measures directed at ensuring that the servicemen are fed on time and that they get their fill of tasty food. For example, doctors and the unit duty officer inspect food quality before it is accepted. Everyday, the unit commander or one of his deputies try the dishes. The monthly food preparation demonstrations and tests occupy a special place among these measures; during the demonstration and test, they check: the entire process for preparing dishes, the completeness of providing ration allowances to the servicemen and also the sanitary status of kitchen and dining hall facilities and equipment.

In the majority of our district's units, these measures are conducted as required and within the established time frame. However, there are cases where they are forgotten as, for example, in the units where Capts A. Masyuk and N. Yakovlev are the food service officers. It is completely logical that this is exactly where the inspectors found that the dining halls were being poorly maintained, there was poor quality in preparing dishes and there were other deficiencies. Of course, the parties guilty of this kind of negligence are severely punished. But, it is very important for commanders, political officers and food service specialists to prevent infractions in setting up food service for personnel. This is specifically promoted by the food preparation demonstrations and tests which are being conducted in precise compliance with current regulations.

REASONS FOR YOUNG OFFICERS LEAVING THE SERVICE DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Jun 74 p 2

[Article by Col A. Khorev: "A Military Journalist's Notes: The Lieutenants' Cross-Roads"]

[Text] At the party committee of one of the Belorussian Military District tank regiments, I was shown an interesting document prepared by Capt N. Zhuchkov. It was called: "The Battalion Party Organization's Procedures for Working on Junior Officers' Ideological, Political and Military Indoctrination" and it really contained some pearls of wisdom. The author's thoughts about what the battalion communists did to assist in the lieutenants' development and what they were not able or capable of doing attracts the reader's attention. Attention specifically dwells on the idea that the years as a lieutenant are essentially the very beginning of an individual's path on his own: school and college, parents and teachers have done their part but their charge still urgently needs their assistance....

At first, this idea seemed to have been dropped somewhat out of the blue but, later, it seemed warranted and true.... I remember three instructive cases on this topic.

Case No 1

After graduating from the Kaliningrad Higher Engineer's School for Engineer Troops imeni A. A. Zhdanov and after serving a year in the Far East Military District, Lt Yuriy Ustinovich submitted a request to transfer in the reserves. MajGen Engr Trps P. Grebenyuk wrote the following conclusion on the request: "To: District Commander. Recommend transfer to the reserve based on certification as an unpromising officer of absolutely no value to the USSR Armed Forces."

"Of absolutely no value...." But, in a seven-page attachment to his request, Ustinovich characterizes himself as completely worthy of this conclusion. "I am not a soldier by nature," he writes "and this is expressed in my inability to command and to make rapid and correct decisions. I cannot inflict punishment on subordinates or even reprimand them. Every word directed at me in a command voice knocks the ground out from under my feet, causes antipathy toward my job.... I am not able to give orders myself; during the year which has passed since I graduated from school, I have not once said: 'I order you.' I am burdened by the requirement to constantly wear boots and tie and to button up all my buttons...."

Like an engineer, he goes on to provide a precise calculation of his overtime. He reports how many times he had to stand guard and duty officer on the weekend and holidays.

They tried to talk Ustinovich out of it but he stood his ground. He did not violate discipline. But, as the saying goes, he served because he had to. It was after this that they wrote: "Of absolutely no value."

Case No 2

Last year, Lt Nikolay Kalmykov graduated with honors from the Baku Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet. For three years as an officer-trainee at the school, he occupied NCO positions; during the last eight months, he carried out the duties of platoon leader. As one of a few graduates, he was certified for the position of motorized rifle company commander. He received an assignment to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and arrived at one of its regiments in August. In November, he submitted a written request for a transfer to the reserves.

The regimental headquarters did not forward his report any further; nobody especially looked into the reason that caused the lieutenant to take this step. The regimental commander was not there, having left LtCol Somov in his place; the regimental political officer and LtCol Somov joked about the enticing prospect of leaving the army...and selling beer in Baku. This is how the matter ended.

Soon afterwards, Kalmykov became sick and was put in the hospital. He spent about a month there and was in a somber mood; the idea of transferring from the regular army did not give him any rest. He did not know anybody in the hospital and he felt all alone. During the entire month, nobody from the regiment visited him. He left the hospital in a sad state of mind. A

fresh annoyance awaited him at the regiment: his room in the BOQ was occupied and his things had been taken to the storeroom. The lieutenant had to move to the barracks and live there for several weeks.

Soon afterwards, Kalmykov obtained ordinary leave, went to Moscow and submitted the same report--which the regiment did not forward--to the Ground Forces Personnel Directorate. While unburdening himself here, he also told about the reasons which drove him to request a transfer from the regular army: from the first days of his arrival in the regiment, the lieutenant encountered a lack of attention, rudeness, and, on occasion, injustice. It cannot be said that all of this was out of the ordinary but a fresh eye picked it up extremely sensitively. The following case made an especially bad impression: when Kalmykov and one of his comrades-in-arms, also a lieutenant, made the same mistake during exercises, LtCol Somov, the acting regimental commander, vented all of his rage on Kalmykov alone. Later it was explained to him that the other lieutenant reportedly occupied a special position in the regiment: he was related to one of their immediate superiors.... Kalmykov did not exactly know whether this was true or not but he endured this as his first, major injustice and became firmly convinced in his decision to leave the regular army.

Case No 3

Lt Viktor Eysan graduated with honors from the Irkutsk Military Air Technical School. He had prepared himself to become a flight engineer in military transport aviation but, upon his arrival at the personnel office, he received an assignment to fighter aviation. He tried to object that this was not his field; he was told:

"They will look into that at the unit."

But, they also did not look into it at the unit. He was told:

"Don't worry, Lieutenant, everything will be okay."

Perhaps everything would have been okay. But, as luck would have it. there was a Military Transport Aviation unit right next door and it did not have enough technicians in Eysan's specialty.... He requested a transfer but was refused. Then, he decided to transfer to the reserve. But, how? He had a daring idea--leave the armed forces...for medical reasons! He was not sick but he began to devise an illness. He was sent to the hospital and was examined for a long time there; finally, they gave him the decision for his transfer.

Over ten years passed. During this time, Viktor Borisovich Eysan graduated from an institute and was working as an engineer at a plant in Taganrog. He is married and is raising three sons. He has a four-room apartment and a garden. He has everything a man needs in life, except peace: he still misses the armed forces. He has written dozens of letters to various headquarters requesting that he be recalled to military duty. He also wrote to our editors. Here are some lines from his letter: "...As a young lieutenant, I did a lot of dumb things; I was discharged from the armed forces--my natural environment which still draws me toward it. I would really like to return to the military. I now have a firm understanding that my calling is military duty and that a man's happiness consists of finding his place in life."

Recently, Viktor Borisovich dropped in on the editors and again requested our assistance.... At the conclusion of our discussion, I asked if it would be possible to tell his story in the newspaper if the occasion arose. He thought awhile and said, sighing:

"Yes.... Let it be a lesson to young lieutenants."

These are the three different cases which jog my mind on the lieutenants' development. Frankly speaking, the cases are paradoxical: the lieutenants requested a transfer to the reserve.... Is this really what they dreamed about when they entered the military school? They had ample time and sufficient opportunities to check their innate capabilities and inclinations and their ideals and ideas about life against the strict requirements and austere conditions of military service. But, should they find themselves at a cross roads after becoming officers, after having their diploma for a higher education and after having accepted responsible duties in commanding people or operating combat equipment?! Of course, this wavering is not characteristic of the majority of our lieutenants.

They are proceeding along a straight, ascending path through life. They are proceeding firmly, boldly, confidently. They are taking milestone after milestone, rung after rung on the run. Yuriy Zolotov and Nikolay Maksimov, Vladimir Mozgovoy and Farid Baybikov, Yuriy Solunin and Mikhail Bismeyev, Dmitriy Romanov and Aleksey Seredokhov.... A long list can be made of the names of junior officers--just in the formation where Capt Zhuchkov served--who have attracted their commanders' attention with their enviable skill and vividly expressed desire to work: to forge combat training, strengthen military discipline and help their subordinates grow ideologically. They do not give any impression at all of a person who has any doubts about his chosen career. They are the majority in every unit.

It is very unfortunate that work with lieutenants is at times only organized by considering such officers. This is obviously how it was in the units where Ustinovich, Kalmykov and Eysan were serving. Their first requests for a transfer to the reserve were more a means of directing attention at their dissatisfaction than a serious intention to leave the regular army. They reasonably hoped that what they did not completely understand would be explained to them, that they would be recognized as being correct or convinced that they were wrong and that realistic steps would be taken. In each of these cases, there were things which needed explaining, there were things to be convinced of and there was both a requirement and an opportunity to take steps. But, nothing turned out this way. Their complaints only evoked a condescending smile from their commanders and political officers: we obviously have a mama's boy here, a touchy person; this is not a kindergarten.... No, of course, nobody said these words to them. But, the lieutenants clearly read them in their eyes, caught them in the pauses, heard them in their tone and saw them in their laughter. And, more and more acutely, they felt they were at a cross-roads.

The weak and vulnerable nature of Ustinovich's, Kalmykov's and Eysan's attitudes, their low will power and moral traits and their lack of preparation in meeting life--of course, all of this is more than obvious. This can be compared to a cowardly retreat. But, regardless of each one's subtleties and character traits, they all arouse sympathy. After all, they were all essentially acting according to the principle: it's easy to remain in the dark with one eye closed. Only Eysan understands this right now. Kalmykov and Ustinovich believe that they "won the battle...." Frankly, I do not believe that Ustinovich told the truth when he wrote about his supposedly innate "lack of military ability." There are reasons to doubt this. Suffice it to say that he applied for school three times: he did not pass the competitive examinations twice. He was on the honor role the entire four years. He had a high evaluation during his troop probationary period. He had a reputation for being disciplined; neither the boots nor the tie were a burden to him. It is completely possible that he brought false accusations against himself. Just as Eysan thought up an illness for himself, Ustinovich hid behind his "inability to punish." Perhaps it was easier on his pride to put it this way rather than to whine: "Mom, I want to come home."

All three of these stories happened at different times, in two military districts and a group of forces and to graduates of different schools. It is even more distressing that they have certain features in common, features which are typical of the attitude toward work with young officers in certain units and with officer trainees at some military schools. Look at the

fact that all three of these lieutenants graduated from school with honors. What does this indicate? First, it obviously indicates their capability and diligence. But, this is not all. The exceptional student has pride which is possibly more strongly developed in him than in others since he has basically only received praise for his exceptional school work from the first grade right up to the time he became a lieutenant. His idea of his personal importance is higher than that of others: Kalmykov was certified for a company directly from his desk as an officer-trainee. This should obviously be considered as a special psychological feature in working with lieutenants. This is precisely how the party instructs us to organize our indoctrination work--by considering the special features of different groups. However, there are still officers who have not made the change; they "never had time" for this kind of consideration, for an individual approach. Well, what kind of "special features" are there in fact when a lieutenant submits a request for a transfer and the regimental commander and political officer are not able to tell him anything except a banal joke about selling beer! It obviously never occurred to them that it was possible to commit a blunder due to a single "joke" like this at a lieutenant's age. Or, take another case out of Kalmykov's story: the lieutenant laid in the hospital for an entire month all alone with his dark thoughts and nobody in the regiment thought about visiting him.... What kind of an "individual approach" is this!

The exceptional students have their own problems at the schools. After all, what is an exceptional student? He is the pride of the school. As a rule, he is an NCO, an active Komsomol member, editor of the wall newspaper and a campaigner. At times, the school does not work with him as much as he works with other officer-trainees. Therefore, sometimes they do not know about his shortcomings and weak points as they should; when they do know, they try not to emphasize them: he is an exceptional student, a supporter!

Judging by these three cases, the schools are obviously giving officer-trainees an inadequate orientation for duty and its real complexities and difficulties; they are not providing them an orientation so they will not rush into keeping notebooks on their unused weekends after they arrive among the troops. This orientation is inseparable from the all-powerful word "must."

The Ground Forces Personnel Directorate has a file drawer where they file letters from junior officers who have been transferred to the reserve requesting they be reinstated to active military service. These are basically letters from repentant people,

drunks who have come to their senses and from people like Eysan who have changed their minds. Not just the people who are repentant and the ones who have thought it over are writing but their fathers, mothers and wives are writing too. What emotion there is in these letters; what lofty words about a calling, adventure and being ready for any difficulty! The personnel directorate answers all these requests in the negative: these are the cases where Moscow does not believe the tears. The party and the people have entrusted the most important duty to their Armed Forces--the security of the motherland. This establishes the high level and uncompromising nature of the requirements levied on the officer corps.

Frankly, we can nevertheless admit: there are people among those who have been discharged who could and should have been retained in the regular forces. A large share of the blame and responsibility for their premature discharge lies with people who neglected their official and party duties--to assist the lieutenants in their development and to support them during difficult times. Capt N. Zhuchkov is obviously correct when he asserts that the junior officer has an urgent requirement for fatherly assistance from his seniors. It's all very well that there are only a few at the vasculating stage. In order to uncover them and create the required degree of stability, it is necessary to work with everybody in a concerned manner, to see each officer-trainee and junior officer and to take into account their age and psychological traits in every way possible to preclude expensive mistakes.

9001
CSO: 1801

CONDITIONS IN RAILWAY WAITING ROOMS CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jun 79 p 2

[Article by LtCol V. Filatov: "The Military Journalist's Column: There Are Such Passengers..."]

[Text] The people who are being transferred to the reserve do not just say their goodbyes to the army on the parade ground and the young recruit's first encounter with army life does not necessarily take place in the barracks. This encounter can begin at the railroad station where there is a serviceman's waiting room. While taking leave of his town, the new recruit can already sense the first signs of army life here; he can see the signs of army organization.

But, does the serviceman's waiting room always meet our ideas about the army and about army organization? The editors received a letter from serviceman A. Tuta; he writes: "I was waiting for a train in the serviceman's waiting room at Yaroslavl' Station. There were not very many servicemen in the waiting room; there were more half-drunk people there. These characters were behaving provocatively; they were smoking, drinking liquor, cussing...in the waiting room." This is the way this serviceman's waiting room was.. Unfortunately, the same thing can be said not just about the Yaroslavl' Station.

Of course, the station chief must primarily show his concern for this waiting room. The type of room allocated for military passengers depends upon him. At other stations, these waiting rooms only "exist" as signs on the wall. The headquarters of the railway station military commandant must show its concern for the serviceman's waiting room. Last but not least, the police [militsiya] plays a role here. Evidently, the proverb "Too many cooks spoil the broth" applies to the military waiting rooms at stations.

In the majority of cases, the servicemen's waiting room contains teams and not individual servicemen. The USSR Internal Service Regulations state: "Personnel of a military train (team) must know and observe the prescribed regulations for conduct during troop movements; they must be vigilant, protect military secrets and safeguard government property." If it can be expressed this way, the serviceman's waiting room at the station is one of the ways of maintaining military order and discipline among servicemen. These are not the usual passengers in the military waiting room--sometimes, they are carrying fully-loaded weapons. They frequently have special cargo with them. At times, things might accidentally slip out in conversation among servicemen in this waiting room, things that some "curious" person would really like to hear, to sniff out, to worm out....

And then, where, if not in this waiting room, can a soldier, sailor, sergeant or petty officer tidy up and put his uniform in order after a long trip? Where, if not in this waiting room, would the commander or team leader be able to engage in indoctrination work with his subordinates? Unfortunately, the servicemen's waiting rooms at several railway stations hardly meet today's requirement. Moreover, the majority of them can in no way be called waiting rooms. They are more like corners which frequently do not even have a permanent location. The teams are accommodated where the commandant orders them to be.

Things are no better at the stations where they have these waiting rooms. For some reason, things have developed so that if there is a servicemen's waiting room, all kinds of commercial facilities are opened up in it; without fail, this waiting room has telephone booths, cash registers, soda machines--and all of this is for common use. Therefore, the people in the station congregate in the serviceman's waiting room.

The guards assigned to protect and defend combat and other equipment being transported by rail are a special topic of conversation. They have to be on the road for weeks. When transferring from one line to another, the guards have a certain amount of time when they would be able to rest, freshen up and get ready for the next trip. But, they are not able to do any of this because the appropriate facilities have not been set up at the station or anywhere else. Experience shows that a special assembly point can be set up for these purposes, even if only in Moscow. This is entirely feasible. It is only necessary for the officials handling these problems

to take the bull by the horns. Meanwhile, guards with holstered weapons can be seen in all kinds of different places in stations.

And, last. A lot of new stations are under construction now. Some of the stations are undergoing major repairs or renovation on an annual basis. What is being done for military passengers? For all practical purposes, nothing. Not a single one of the designs for new stations provide for a serviceman's waiting room; these specific types of passengers supposedly do not exist in nature. But, there are such passengers and they require special attention.

9001

CSO: 1801

FIELD FUEL SERVICING OPERATIONS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jun 79 p 1

[Article by Col V. Nagornyy, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent:
"Report from a Logistics Unit Combat Support-Technical
Exercise: In a Front-Line Manner"]

[Text] The day was still and sultry. A ringing silence reigned over the training center. Suddenly, a reddish cloud of dust appeared on its furthest border. It began to grow and rise above the treetops; now, a heavy rumble can be heard clearly. Soon afterwards, a large cargo truck appeared on the field road; behind it was another, another... The powerful prime movers were travelling in a column as if they were linked together by straps. SrLt Yu. Volkov was leading the unit. After turning, the vehicles hid in the young forest within a minute or so. The drivers immediately set about camouflaging the equipment. Air surveillance and outposts were set up; a two-man patrol moved along the established route....

This is how the combat support-tactical exercise began for several logistics units. The field situation approximated combat as much as possible. Feverish activity was in full swing in the area where materiel was being transferred, especially at the site where fuel was being transferred from vehicle to vehicle. You could easily see groups of vehicles coming here from both directions. Some of them had gasoline and diesel fuel tanks in the bed. Others were travelling toward them without a load--they had to take the cargo and deliver it further, to the place where the advancing units were waiting for them.

Capt S. Podgornyy, an experienced logistics specialist, was directing the work. The transfer began at several points simultaneously. The high degree of teamwork in the actions of SrLt V. Ikonnikov's and Lt A. Popov's subordinates--who were transferring the fuel--was a prerequisite for the precise

nature of the operations. They had established communications and precisely set up the assignment of manpower and equipment even before their arrival in this area. Now, each soldier was confidently and skillfully accomplishing his duties.

Pvt N. Belyy, the senior driver, was working by the motor-driven pump. The light hum of the pumping mechanism says that everything has been adjusted in the best possible manner here. The fuel from the large metal tank immediately enters several drums. Not a drop is lost.

Competition for conservation and economy has been developed on a widespread basis among Capt Podgornyy's subordinates, who continually handle POL. The servicemen in the unit have a high level of specialized and technical training; advanced techniques are disseminated in every way possible.

A little to the side of the motor-driven pump, a fuel bladder is being transferred. Obeying a signal from WO V. Odintsev, Pvt N. Likhachev, the vehicle-crane operator, carefully raises the crane arm. The bladder, which is somewhat reminiscent of a balloon hangs over the truck. Several seconds later, the container is precisely loaded on the receiving vehicle. This type of transfer is swift and reliable. But, the logistics specialists are practicing various alternative operations--when a "package" of six containers is brought up, the barrels are transferred from one truck to another and they are transferred by the vehicle crane and a sling; fuel is pumped from container to container, from tank truck to tank truck.... A great deal of knowledge and skill is required to accomplish each operation within short periods of time and to ensure an uninterrupted supply of POL to units. The logistics servicemen are steadily improving their skill under field conditions; they are struggling to break each norm and to accomplish each combat training mission in an exemplary manner.

9001

CSO: 1801

PHYSICAL TRAINING IN THE SOUTHERN GROUP OF FORCES DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Jun 79 p 4

[Article by LtGen A. Zaytsev, first deputy commander, Southern Group of Forces: "The Result Depends Upon the Approach"]

[Text] The tankers began double-timing at a pace which generated doubt: would they be able to maintain it to the end. But, drawn forward by Capt V. Dvorovoy, their commander, the servicemen continued running without reducing their speed. They were also persistently struggling for a victory in other aspects of the competitive program; they demonstrated the level of their team training and superior physical conditioning; they really deserved taking first place in the group of forces' championship for company and equivalent unit-level all-around sports events.

We have only recently developed this type of para-military competition; however, it has already gained popularity. Personnel cohesiveness, the industriousness of each soldier and his physical conditioning are most vividly displayed during the competitions for the all-around company-level events. Moreover, not just the unit personnel are tried: the instructors and members of sports committees are sort of tested. After all, the level of physical training and the quality of fire and drill training are established during these kinds of mass events.

As shown by the competitions for the company-level all-around events, the battery commanded by Capt A. Temirbayev did not pull through precisely this kind of test. It was clear that the unit was not prepared for the competitions and none of the fire-drill measures, as the saying goes, which they took were able to prevent their failure now. It turned out that the overall level of mass sports work was low in the battery; the sections were working on a haphazard basis; team practice was conducted on an irregular basis; and little attention was devoted to military drills.

Two units and two elements with approximately equal conditions for developing sports. Where did this discrepancy in their ratings come from? In my opinion, a lot depends on the commander, on his initiative and personal example. Capt V. Dvorovoy has a 1st class rating in cross-country races and a 2nd class rating in weight lifting. The EM are trying to become just as dexterous, strong and hardy as their commander. Of no less importance is the fact that this element, just like the unit's other companies, is indoctrinating the servicemen with the physical and psychological traits and skills required for combat in a systematic and goal-directed manner. It is not by accident that the unit's teams (Capt I. Boyko, physical training and sports OIC) have already won first place within the group of forces this year in the officer's triathlon and second place in the military triathlon.

Each morning, the unit commander greets the troops at the morning exercises. Incidentally, only officers lead the exercises; they do not sluff off the exercises on the NCO's and WO's. By being responsible for the personnel's superior physical training, the unit commander and his subordinates are teaching them to take a very serious attitude toward this important section of combat training.

The air defense artillery unit which was, until recently, commanded by LtCol V. D'yachenko was also singled out by its good results in applied military sports. Again, the commander's personal example had a very good effect here. He ran cross-country races and was able to demonstrate any gymnastic exercise and he was able to precisely hit the targets. It is not surprising that the unit's servicemen continually returned from competitions with trophies and certificates and that they won the championship in the inspection of mass sports work.

But, now a young, energetic officer has become the unit commander. It turned out that he and his deputy--also a recent arrival to the regiment--are directing their subordinates to achieve even higher sports ratings. However, this did not happen and the air defense artillerymen are now satisfied with average results at the competitions.

The new commander looks at sports as a secondary matter. For example, the conversation which took place recently between him and an officer from higher headquarters is typical: "What is this, Petr Mikhaylovich? Aren't you in favor of mass sports work?" the officer reproached him. "At the very worst, I will be reprimanded for neglecting sports and physical training. But, the punishment will be more severe for errors in combat

training," he explained. In his opinion, only the physical training and sports OIC should set up mass sports work and engage in physical training in the companies and batteries. This is an incorrect opinion. This is precisely the problem: it is the "cool" attitude of certain commanders towards sports that has a negative effect on setting up physical training within the regiment as a whole.

Here is what happened in the unit we are discussing. Maj V. Popovich, the physical training and sports OIC, is an experienced officer. He would be able to do a lot; however, his skills are not being used in his assignment. The officer is supervising all kinds of additional duties; he has been assigned as vehicle OIC, etc. That is, he is frequently occupied with everything except his immediate duties.

Unfortunately, there are a lot of cases like this. SrLt V. Vitkov is a junior specialist. Naturally, he needs assistance and support. But, he is forced to do various jobs which are not in his career field; on top of this, they intend to send him on extended temporary duty which, again, is in no way connected with physical training. It's good that the senior commanders interceded on time and changed the decision.

Meanwhile, mass sports work is being neglected in the regiment; poor methods are being used in conducting physical training lessons; and applied military sports are developing poorly. By the way, for a long time, things were not very good for Capt I. Boyko--PT OIC in the same regiment, whose men won the competition for the company-level all-around events. It was primarily the officer's own fault for not being diligent at his job. The unit commander ordered his subordinate to shape up and, at the same time, while trying to find out what was interfering with getting the planned measures set up and accomplished in a clear-cut manner, he became more deeply involved in his work and the activities of the sports committee.

Since then, Capt I. Boyko's work style has changed drastically. Sensing the support, he increased his supervision over the servicemen's physical training and set about improving sports facilities and creating conditions to train MSS [Military Sports System] badge holders and rated sportsmen. All of the servicemen adopted higher socialist pledges for sports and they are trying to accomplish them within the deadline.

Physical training and mass sports work are important components for improving the combat readiness of troops. This must not be forgotten.

STAFF WORK FOR TROOP SERVICES DISCUSSED

In a Military District

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jun 79 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen Arty L. Mash'yanov: "The Staff and Troop Service: Analysis, Conclusions, Measures"]

[Text] The district's staff officers twice had to work in this unit in the past training year. It was not conspicuous for the organization of troop service. There were instances of infractions of military order here. The unit commander and chief of the political department did not take effective steps to prevent them. Attention was also drawn by the fact that both the commander and the political officer were not delving deeply into the organization of internal service and did not know which of the subunits had organized it best and which the worst.

A detailed analysis showed that the unit was not giving proper attention to preparation of the daily detail or to monitoring its performance of service. Other officials, primarily the unit staff officers and subunit commanders, took on themselves much that the unit duty officer and subunit duty officers, for example, were obligated to do. The duty officer thus was given the role of a passive executor of commands and instructions received, to put it mildly. As a result, the officers performing the duties of unit duty officer became accustomed to the thought that their chief concern was to report a violation of regulation order and not to prevent it.

It also was learned that the service of personnel on the daily detail essentially was not evaluated here. It stands to reason that the unit commander and subunit commanders do make general remarks when they are relieved. But they had no specific data at their disposal about who was performing duties in what way. If this is so, there can be no mention about a thorough analysis of the quality of service performance or the publicity and comparability of results achieved. Consequently, the mobilizing force of competition is being used far from fully.

Unfortunately, the previous unit commander was not able to take efficient or effective steps to eliminate the shortcomings revealed. He was given a demotion by decision of the senior chief and the unit was taken over by another officer, Lt Col Ye. Sdobnov. Relying on the party and Komsomol organizations, he vigorously took to imposing regulation order. Staff officers of the combined unit and of the district staff gave him daily assistance.

A seminar class was held with subunit commanders and chiefs of staff and deputy unit commanders on problems of troop service. It was learned that some appointed officers had a shaky knowledge of their functional duties and poor skills in performing them.

The chief goal of the seminar class naturally was to arm its participants with the necessary knowledge and experience. This task of course could not be resolved with one seminar, and so workers on the combined unit staff and district staff taught officers in practice how to organize troop service.

We also proposed that the unit introduce a methodology of organizing the monitoring and evaluation of service performance by persons of the daily detail which had proven itself in practice. Lt Col N. Lyutskan studied and generalized the experience of its practical use in a number of units. He also elaborated specific recommendations on applying the methodology in the given unit.

I will note that the basis of the methodology includes the principle of thorough training and detailed briefing of the unit duty officer, subunit duty officers, motor pool duty officer and mess hall duty officer with consideration of their service experience and job qualities. For example, the unit duty officer is told the time for checking the guard and where to go during the evening check and reveille. Prior to the relief he must give a grade to each subunit for quality of preparing the daily detail, for the quality of its performance of service, for the personnel's observance of the order of the day and so on. A number of other organizational measures also are provided for.

The unit commander, staff and political department were very energetic in taking up the implementation of the proposed methodology and its specification with consideration of the specific features of conditions and missions being performed by the subunits. Special attention was drawn to the fact that persons on the daily detail became genuine champions of firm regulation order. Take the very same unit duty officers. In many instances they prevent possible infractions of military discipline. The unit commander and staff make daily use of their reports and observations for improving troop service.

It is true that at first the problems were not avoided. For example, Capt V. Korchkov and certain other officers at first reduced their role as unit duty officers primarily to registering infractions of discipline and collecting data necessary for giving grades. This deficiency was revealed

in good time and analyzed at an official conference. And here the proposal was made to give the unit duty officer a grade for performance of service.

This apparently is a small innovation, but how the officers performing duties as unit duty officers drew themselves up. Each one wanted to earn the highest grade. They also were vigorous in making proposals for improving troop service, for economic use of supplies, fuel and electrical power, and so on. For example, Maj V. Boyev directed attention in the course of his duty to the fact that rear services installations had a clear excess of illumination at night. He prepared and substantiated his suggestions, implementation of which permitted a 20 percent reduction in the consumption of electrical power.

Much is being done simultaneously in the unit to ensure the precise performance of guard service. Inspections of the guard play no small part here. A schedule was drawn up for this purpose, but here is what an analysis performed by Lt Col Sdobnov showed: Some appointed officers were violating the schedule while others were performing the check, but superficially, for form's sake. Results of the analysis became the subject of a detailed discussion at an official conference and a party meeting.

The unit duty officers now were giving more attention to the guard service. For example, in monitoring the personnel's preparations for going on guard duty, Capt R. Khokhlov uncovered a number of serious omissions. What was the matter? It turned out that the subunit commander who prepared the personnel for going on guard duty did not have the necessary methods skills. The unit commander decided to prepare and hold a demonstration class, which was of great benefit, especially for the young subunit commanders.

A little over half a year has gone by since the unit began to introduce the new methodology. During this time tangible results have been achieved and there has been a considerable improvement in military discipline and internal order in the unit's subunits. First place at the present time belongs to the subunit commanded by Officer A. Boychevskiy. The daily detail here performs service strictly by the regulation and gives the commander active assistance in maintaining exemplary military order.

It should be noted that voices were raised at the very beginning which cast doubt on the introduction of these innovations. Now all unit officers are convinced of their benefit with their own eyes. I recently had occasion to chat with the unit political department chief on this subject. He told about the positive changes with a sense of satisfaction.

"Things have begun to improve even in the subunit which previously was farthest behind," said the political worker. "We hope that it will catch up with our leaders in a few months."

The improvement in troop service and military discipline creates a firm foundation for the unit personnel's fulfillment of combat and political training plans and of competition pledges.

Need for Good Staff Work Emphasized

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jun 79 p 1

[Editorial: "The Staff and Troop Service"]

[Text] The organization of troop service which ensures the most favorable conditions for daily work of subunits and units and their constant combat readiness is one of the factors on which the rhythm and effectiveness of combat and political training and the condition of military discipline and order depend.

This service represents a complex of activities involving the maintenance of strict regulation order in barracks, military posts and motor pools; the assurance of safekeeping for equipment and weapons; reliable security of military installations; and fulfillment of the order of the day. It affects all aspects of the life of units. The better it is organized, the higher are results of military labor and the more effective is the training and indoctrination process in the final account.

Problems of troop service are resolved concretely and thoughtfully, for example, in the guards tank regiment where Gds Lt Col V. Tashimov is chief of staff. The commander and staff are guided strictly by the requirements of regulations and take account of the character and scope of missions being performed by the unit in each stage and by local features. The tankers' tenor of life facilitates effective combat training, a strengthening of discipline and the shaping of high political and moral-combat qualities in the personnel. The regiment's achievements in combat training and socialist competition are high and stable.

The commander is the immediate organizer of troop service and the champion of military order as defined by laws, regulations, orders and the instructions of chiefs. He is invested with high trust of the party and government and bears personal responsibility for the combat readiness of his entrusted subunit or unit. He implements his plans and concepts with reliance on the staff. The staff's role is exceptionally great in maintaining a troop service which functions effectively.

The staff is called upon to introduce a planned basis into troop service, to provide for regular demonstration and instructional methods classes with personnel going on the daily detail, and to provide measures for monitoring the service of guards and for improving the outfitting of posts and guard-houses. Planning is an important condition for an even allocation of loads on subunits, for regulating the officers' workday and for vigilant performance of service by personnel.

Improving indoctrinational work with persons and increasing each person's sense of personal responsibility for the quality of service at the entrusted post is the basic way for improving troop service. An awareness that

service in the guard or daily detail has a most direct relationship to combat readiness must be implanted firmly in the soldiers. The precision in the subunit or unit's actions in response to the assembly signal and the day-to-day order in which each mission is accomplished precisely and on time depends on the knowledge, skills, internal mobilization and execution of appointed detail personnel. It is exceptionally important to have staff supervision over the personnel's purposeful, systematic study of combined-arms regulations. It is necessary to use all forms and means of political, military and legal indoctrination to ensure that the provisions of regulations are immutable rules of conduct for each serviceman and the standard of life for each military collective.

The work of the staff as a control and monitoring entity must be concentrated in the subunits. In implementing the commander's decision on organization of troop service, the staff is called upon to assist young officers and warrant officers in every possible way to strengthen discipline, to maintain exemplary internal order, and to fulfill regulations, orders and instructions precisely.

Guard service, which is the performance of a combat mission in peacetime, is a subject of special concern for the staff. The careful briefing of soldiers going on guard duty, an improvement in the methodology of checking the service, propaganda of sentries' exploits, and skillful use of moral incentives all are extremely important for indoctrinating personnel in a spirit of high vigilance and for shaping steadfastness and courage in the soldiers. Problems of fire safety and the security and defense of military installations at temporary subunit locations--training centers, exercise areas and remote ranges--deserve the special attention of the staff during the summer months.

The preciseness of troop service depends to a significant extent on chiefs of combat arms and services. They must delve into its organization and perform objective indoctrinational work in subordinate subunits. It is necessary to put a decisive end to the opinion existing in places that troop service is only the concern of commanders and chiefs of staff. This is a vital job for each manager, no matter what his functional duties.

The role of a large detachment of junior commanders--sergeants and petty officers--is great in maintaining firm regulation order and in exemplary arrangement of troop service. It is the staff's duty to find ways to improve the training and indoctrination of this category of command personnel, to increase the activeness of sergeants and petty officers in the struggle for high personnel discipline and execution, and to strengthen their authority in every possible way.

Valuable experience continually builds up and a great deal that is new and foremost is originated in day-to-day military labor. This also is typical of troop service. The generalization, propaganda and persistent implementation of experience is an inalienable part of the work of staffs and staff party organizations.

We must decisively curtail indulgences in the organization of troop service and attempts to interpret the demands of regulations in a different way. Instead of increasing the personal sense of responsibility of appointed detail persons--from the company orderly to the regimental duty officer--some units unfortunately take the path of appointing additional "responsible persons." This can produce nothing but harm.

Political entities and party organizations are called upon to assist commanders and staffs actively in arranging troop service. Their task is to support exacting commanders in every possible way, to strengthen their authority and to ensure that personal examples are set by party and Komsomol members in performing service. The interests of the matter require a discussion of troop service problems at party and Komsomol meetings and that its indoctrinational role be used more fully.

To achieve a further improvement in troop service means to create conditions for a successful fulfillment of summer training plans and programs and socialist pledges and to elevate the combat readiness of units and ships to a new level.

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CSO: 1801

PHYSICAL TRAINING SHORTCOMINGS NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jun 79 p 4

[Article by Col N. Tikhonenkov, chief of physical training and sports, Red Banner Turkestan Military District: "Don't Let the Fire Go Out: Competition--A Search and Initiative"]

[Excerpts] Capt V. Mistyuk, the battalion commander, was not able to grasp this, in his opinion, completely unexplainable fact: in spite of the fact that the unit had good results in its specialty training, the tabulated results showed that the battalion had not fulfilled the socialist pledges it had adopted for the training period. Insufficient physical training for the communicators was responsible for this.

"How can that be?" the officer shrugged his shoulders in bewilderment. "We have lessons on a rather regular basis. Komsomol members like these performed with initiative. With the slogan: "An MSS [Military Sports System] Badge for Every Specialist!"

In explaining what had happened, the other battalion officers talked about the lack of good training facilities and a qualified physical training specialist and about the shortage of time allocated for lessons and training sessions.

Actually, there were other reasons for the failure: a lack of sufficient organizational work on the part of the battalion commander, the absence of a well thought out approach in planning physical training lessons and inefficient utilization of the time set aside by the daily schedule for mass sports work. Thus, physical training lessons were frequently replaced with lessons in other areas in the company schedules. In place of sports practice, personnel frequently went out on various jobs in the civilian economy. This is the reason the battalion pledges for MSS badge holders and rated sportsmen were not fulfilled.

There is another aspect throughout this entire story which causes at least as much bewilderment. How did it happen that the Komsomol members' initiative--which the battalion commander talked about--was not supported by him or by the party organization? After all, in the beginning, competitions were conducted among platoons and an attempt was even made to organize a sports holiday. But, the matter did not proceed beyond the talking stage. Capt V. Mistyuk and several other officers were not able to evaluate the young people's initiative based on its merits.

While talking about Komsomol members from the rostrum at the 25th CPSU Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, pointed out that "They are truly ready to provide a warm response for any good undertakings. But, the clash with stereotyped procedures and a bureaucratic approach to indoctrination work puts out the fire. Our mission is to not only preserve this fire but also to fan it."

This is precisely what the commander and several of the other battalion communists were not able to do or did not want to do.

Experience shows that the statistics for sports work will always be higher in those places where the commanders have become true organizers of physical training for personnel, where they rely on the initiative of party and Komsomol organizations in this activity and where they support it in every way possible.

Commanders, party and Komsomol organizations and unit sports committees must respond to and support all beneficial initiatives; these initiatives must serve the further development of mass sports.

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